Standing Committee B

[Mr. Joe Benton in the Chair]

Private Security Industry Bill [Lords]

Clause 1 - The Security Industry Authority

Question proposed [10 April], That the clause stand part of the Bill. 
 Question again proposed.

Nick Hawkins: I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Benton. We are confident that we shall prosper under your wise chairmanship as we did under that of your co-Chairman, Mr. Winterton.
 Before the Committee adjourned for the short recess, I was describing the concerns of Conservative Members about the future role of the lay magistracy in relation to the Bill. That is an issue to which my noble Friend Lord Cope referred in another place on 30 January and to which we shall return when discussing subsequent clauses. However, we also have other worries about clause 1, such as those to which reference was made at column 564 of the Official Report in another place on 30 January. It concerned whether the Bill would be better if it applied to people who were employed wholly or predominantly as security operatives. 
 As my noble Friend Viscount Astor said on that occasion, there is still some confusion about the position of people who are working full-time or part-time in the security industry. It should be clear that the new authority is responsible for those who are either full-time or predominantly employed as security operatives. For example, let us consider barmen. They are frequently called on to exclude people from pubs. Some busy pubs in city centres operate as late-night bars and have people who look after security. However, many pubs do not employ full-time security doormen, but use the bar staff when people need to be excluded. It would be excessively burdensome for such barmen to be covered by the authority. 
 On Second Reading in another place, the Under-Secretary, Lord Bassam, said that the Bill might catch publicans, and we are concerned about how and to what extent that will work. An amendment was tabled to add the words 
``people employed wholly or predominantly as security operatives'' 
and to ensure that the Bill would cover only the operation of people who work in security as a principal part of their employment. 
 As the Minister will be aware, there has been much correspondence from those in the security industry, particularly from the licensed trade. Some people in the industry want to extend as widely as possible the provisions of the new body. Some see it as a wonderful business opportunity. There is always the danger that a regulatory measure can act as a job creation scheme and set up a completely new bureaucracy. We sympathise with those who do not want the industry to be faced with costly over-regulation. We want the new body to work. We do not want it to be heavy-handed. We want any regulation to be a light-touch measure.

John Bercow: My hon. Friend knows that I share his concern. Does he agree that there would be a greater argument for including the pub trade within the provisions of the clause if there were a demonstrable problem of people in public houses behaving heavy-handedly and abusing their authority? As that would not seem to be the case, does he agree that there is no need to extend the power?

Nick Hawkins: My hon. Friend is right, but the difficulty lies in the fact that there are different kinds of pubs. As I said earlier, some pubs operate as city-centre late-night bars and have their own security staff, and it is clear that such full-time security staff should be covered by the new agency. However, we do not want pubs that have no need for full-time security staff to be covered as a by-product or side-effect of the provisions.
 In my remarks before we adjourned for the Easter recess, I touched on concerns about how training should operate. More information is coming to light as the Bill progresses, and a fascinating letter was passed to me during the short recess. Michelle Mackleston from Newcastle-under-Lyme in Staffordshire is a qualified training officer for the Security Industry Training Organisation who works in the security industry and was a warrant officer in the armed forces. She wrote to my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe) about her concerns, and perhaps the Minister can deal with them in his response to this debate. 
 Miss Mackleston asks what the word ``training'' means in clause 1. From her experience working at the sharp end, she points out that, while training security staff, she has encountered individuals who have worked in the security industry for years without any basic training. Those people tell her about their experiences. One person who came to her for training told her that on starting work in the security industry 
 ``I was told to carry a piece of 2 by 4'' 
for protection. Some people told her that they thought it appropriate for men to search women—with no regard for the possible later allegations of indecent assault. She had also been asked to train people who, although they had been working in the security industry for years, had not been told anything about the powers of citizen's arrest. She wrote: 
 ``When I hear comments like these I begin to worry about not only the security officers safety but also the safety of the people in the areas where the security officers are working.'' 
She knows that reputable 
``companies do train their officers (to BS7499) -but what about the ones who do not.'' 
Miss Mackleston is concerned about the number of people who are unaware of the obligations of criminal law regarding the restraining of individuals and the use of minimum force, and security people who believe that it is legitimate to use handcuffs and batons. Those are the concerns of someone working at the sharp end in the industry, and perhaps they touch on some of the points raised by the right hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) at an earlier stage of our deliberations. 
 Conservative Members feel that the remit for the powers of the new authority as drafted in the Bill is too wide. The provisions in subsection (3) are astonishingly wide. It states: 
 ``The Authority may do anything that it considers is calculated to facilitate, or is incidental or conducive to, the carrying out of any of its functions.'' 
That is a wide brief. In the other place, we sought to test the breadth of subsection (3) with an amendment designed to stop the authority borrowing money, and, more importantly, to require annual consultation with the industry to be written into the Bill. 
 That point is similar to a point raised by one of the amendments tabled by the right hon. Member for Walsall, South that was starred for our previous sitting. We still feel that such a move would be greatly welcomed by the reputable side of the industry—trade bodies such as the British Security Industry Association and the Joint Security Industry Council. Are the Government prepared at least to contemplate later, perhaps on Report, adding wording to reduce the breadth of the wide words in subsection (3)? We look forward to the Minister's response.

Ronnie Fearn: I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Benton. It is not the first time that I have sat with you in Parliament, and we sat together on Sefton council many times, you with the Labour group and me with the Liberal Democrats. We got on well together, so I am sure that the Committee will go smoothly.
 The hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Mr. Hawkins) touched on the fact that the powers in the Bill are wide. They are not specified anywhere, and I have read the Bill closely. The Secretary of State seems to have overall consent and power. How is the industry being consulted? Will representatives from other sectors, such as the police, be invited to serve on the body? Those important questions should be dealt with.

Bruce George: I used the recess profitably, visiting Denmark to consider further its excellent regulation. My attempt to consider security legislation in the Ukraine was less successful, as I only reached Heathrow, proffered the wrong passport minus the visa for the Ukraine, and was back in the office at 7 o'clock in the morning. However, having been there twice before for the same purpose, I feel that I have a handle on the system there.
 Although I have been critical of aspects of the Bill and its predecessors, I am reasonably satisfied with the clause. In almost all cases, clause 1 is in essence the nub of a Bill, and this one is perfectly okay. 
 I am especially delighted given the fact that the Government could have used another model of regulation, many of which are available in this country. Another Department or, as in many countries, the police could have been responsible for regulation. In Germany, much is done by an economic, industrial Department. Wisely, however, the Government have chosen the model of a non-departmental public body. 
 The Bill bears more than a superficial resemblance to my first private Member's Bill on the subject, which was published in 1977 and subsequently disappeared without trace for a quarter of a century. I like the fact that clause 1 shows the symbiotic relationship between the Home Office and the Security Industry Authority: one is dependent on the other. The Bill provides the Home Office with information and consent and decentralises much of the decision making to the regulatory body, while the Home Secretary reserves his or perhaps her rights to instruct, advise and be consulted. 
 That could be an ideal relationship of neither dependence nor total independence. It establishes some independence from the industry. Although the industry must be seriously consulted, the model will not be the voluntary self-regulatory one that we had before. Responsibility will be divided between the Home Office and the regulatory body. That is the best model because it is the most flexible. It is good that a Department has not been given sole responsibility for regulation, because Departments often fail to develop the necessary expertise and flexibility. 
 The police feel that, in some ways, the private security industry is a competitor. If they had been given a dominant regulatory role, some people would have cried foul: it would have been thought, erroneously perhaps, that the police were protecting their own interests, rather than those of the public. 
 Mixed regulatory systems that involve many layers of government frequently breed conflicts over responsibility: problems of jurisdiction might arise as legislation is introduced in Scotland and Wales—and Northern Ireland already has its own rules. 
 I have studied a wide variety of regulatory systems in countries around the world. Regulation can be categorised as either narrow or broad. Opposition Members have said that they want a light-touch regulatory system. I am in favour not of heavy-touch systems but of broader and deeper modes of regulation. The Home Office has, perhaps, achieved the right balance between those categories. 
 However, the Bill is narrow: it covers man guarding and the activities of private eyes, with regard largely to their man-guarding functions, but it excludes many other aspects of the security industry that should be included in the regulations. Many security companies engage in a range of activities other than man guarding that involve, for instance, alarms and information technology. A broad regulatory system should therefore be chosen. 
 A distinction should also be drawn between shallow regulation, which might merely permit access to criminal records, and deep regulation, which lays down standards concerning a range of matters such as education, training and insurance. Regulation should, therefore, be regarded in terms of breadth and depth.

John Bercow: Does the right hon. Gentleman's support for a broad approach lead him to favour the inclusion within the terms of the legislation of public houses that do not employ designated security officers? As he knows, my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath objected to that.

Bruce George: The majority of public houses have security problems, although there are a fortunate few that do not. Many 19th-century pugilists ended up either as chucker outers or as the owners of the licensed premises where they worked. They dealt with their security problems in a manner unique to middle-aged, 22-stone pugilists.
 If a public house does not employ designated security officers, their role might have to be undertaken by other staff, so the definition of security staff presents problems. There are so many marginal or tangential—although not peripheral—sectors of the security industry. Many employees perform security roles. If a driver pulls off the M1 to visit a service station to buy a copy of The Guardian—although I suspect that Conservative Members would be unlikely to buy that newspaper—the sales assistant might have a screen that monitors what is happening in the rest of the building. 
 The problem of definition would bedevil any legislation. I failed O-level maths so I am not in a position to offer advice concerning horizontal explanations, but depth of regulation takes account of entry requirements for firms and individuals wanting to operate in the industry and minimum standards of operation, and I feel that the Bill is in between shallow and deep. I devised five models of regulation: non-interventionist—which we have had until now—minimum narrow, minimum wide, comprehensive narrow and comprehensive wide. My view, and that of professionals in the security field, is that if we consider the top 10 countries in terms of a successful, accountable, regulated security industry, we can see that most of the best-regulated systems have a combination of breadth and depth. The Opposition want the system to be narrow—just covering man guarding—and shallow, whereas I think that it should be wide and deep. I suspect that the Home Secretary and the Minister are in favour of something in between. The clause is admirable—I will not be quite as eulogistic about all the other clauses—it sets the scene, and I support it.

Ian Stewart: Good morning, Mr. Benton. It is good to see you in the Chair. I, too, am happy with the clause. The industry to which it applies ranges from well-organised, well-regulated companies to, at the other end of the spectrum, cowboys. I want to speak about the cowboy end.
 I should declare an interest. Most people know that I am a lifelong trade unionist, and although I am extremely keen for the clause to be implemented in relation to standards, I believe, on the basis of personal experience, that because of the nature of the cowboy firms—doormen in clubs and pubs provide a good example—it is problematic in terms of industrial relations. A large number of people involved at that end of the industry pursue their activities within the black economy. That militates against good and proper standards in the industry, which are the subject of the clause. The one matter cannot be considered separately from the other. 
 During my 20 years as a Transport and General Workers Union regional officer I had occasion to recruit those who are known, colloquially, as bouncers. The nature of the recruitment was such that I did not have to go looking for them. Every December, they would come knocking on the union's door, asking to join. I came to realise that they would knock on the door in December, make use of their union identity for that month as a bargaining lever to ensure the highest possible return for working over Christmas and the new year, and in January they would no longer be members. Such playing of the game was endemic in the black economy. 
 I am firmly in favour of good, sensible and appropriate minimum regulation, as outlined in the clause. In turn, however, the Government should not forget that employment regulations are equally important.

Charles Clarke: I join my colleagues in welcoming you as Chairman, Mr. Benton. I hope that you will find the Committee interesting, and I am sure that we shall conduct ourselves in order under your stewardship.
 I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South for his comments on the clause. He is right to say that it raises a question of balance of judgment. He is also right to emphasise, as I have sought to do throughout, that the process will be dynamic rather than static. As we examine the situation, we must see how we can make progress and respond to such circumstances. 
 I was grateful for the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Eccles (Mr. Stewart) because he summed up his experience of organising many of the people who work in one sector of the industry, and of the practical problems that we are trying to address. I shall refer to his comments when I mention training. 
 I agree with the hon. Member for Southport (Mr. Fearn) about the need for proper consultation and collaboration in the process. There has been a full consultation process since the publication of the White Paper, and my colleagues and I have had many meetings with the industry and the police to discuss the matter. The membership of the authority is addressed in the schedule. As the hon. Gentleman knows, we have debated issues such as the extent to which the Bill should specify interests. I want to reinforce two points. First, we believe that it is critical that the authority is independent in character and is not merely an in-house operation. Secondly, the authority should contain people who can ensure that it operates in an informed and intelligent way, because of their professional experience and knowledge of the industry. I assure the hon. Gentleman that such a factor will be a major consideration when we address the make-up of the authority. 
 I shall address the specific points of the hon. Member for Surrey Heath. On the matter of the licensed trade, it is important to make a point that follows on from an observation made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South. The Bill does not cover publicans or any other people who perform security duties that are incidental to their main employment. There was confusion about that in the other place, in the debate to which the hon. Member for Surrey Heath referred. I make it clear that where security responsibility is incidental to a person's main employment, the Bill does not cover that individual. An illustration is that the bouncer is covered but not the barman, because the bouncer is retained specifically for security responsibilities as the main part of his employment. The barman is not covered because his main concern is to serve the drinks and run the pub, rather than security matters. I hope that that clarifies the matter. 
 The Bill does not cover a wide variety of people who undertake security activities incidentally. My right hon. Friend referred to many such people who undertake security as a bit of their job, but are not covered by the Bill. We are specifically focusing on the security industry.

John Bercow: I think that what the Minister is saying is clear, but I want to establish it beyond peradventure. Will he confirm that the definition or job title of an individual establishes what is incidental and what is not, rather than the frequency with which he or she may have to deal with outbreaks of disorder?

Charles Clarke: That is correct. The point is what is the main employment, and therefore what is the definition of that employment. There are other Bills currently before the House, or in the other place, in which we are considering issues such as outbreaks of disorder in other circumstances. That is not germane to the key purpose of this Bill, which is to focus on people whose main employment is within the security industry.
 On training, I was interested in the letter that the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald received from the trainer in Newcastle-under-Lyme. I think that it illustrated as clearly as anything could the importance of training in the process. That is why subsection (2)(e) states that a function of the authority shall be 
``to set or approve standards of conduct, training and levels of supervision''. 
That is key to the clause. Many argue for a much stronger and better training regime—individual Members of Parliament with experience of the matter, trade unions and many of the companies involved. We should establish what types of training are involved, both on fundamental issues such as what forms of restraint may be used in which circumstances—handcuffs have been mentioned, for example—and on how to operate generally. Consideration must be given to whether carrying a two by four is the appropriate way in which to deal with such situations. 
 The hon. Member for Surrey Heath referred to well-established organisations that have done a lot of work in such matters, such as the Security Industry Training Organisation, the National Security Inspectorate, the British Security Industry Association and the Joint Security Industry Council. They would be the first to say that to establish a national regime whereby standards are approved by a national body is the right way forward. The letter to which he referred emphasised the strength of the case for such action. It will be a central function of the authority. 
 I cannot be as helpful about the hon. Gentleman's final point as he would wish. Subsection (3) states: 
 ``The Authority may do anything that it considers is calculated to facilitate, or is incidental or conducive to, the carrying out of any of its functions''. 
That is an important responsibility of the authority. We live in a dynamic world. An example to which reference has already been made is the fact that 30 years ago the current structure of security in pubs and clubs would not have been recognisable. The industry has evolved. My right hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South referred to the security camera. Reforms in the industry will take place because of the rapid process of change. It is an important obligation of the authority to have that responsibility under subsection (3). 
 We are not considering further amendments to define that provision more widely. I say in its defence that the clause is only ancillary to the SIA's function, which is why it is covered by subsection (3), not subsection (2). Its power is not that broad: it is supplementary to what else is happening. The power is important, however, for the reasons of change that I have set out. I urge the Committee to agree to the clause. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2 - Directions etc. by the Secretary of State

John Bercow: I beg to move amendment No. 19, in page 2, line 24, at end insert—
 `(2A) The Secretary of State shall lay a copy of any such direction before each House of Parliament.'.
 It is a pleasure, Mr. Benton, to echo the welcome to you that has been expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath and the Minister of State. We look forward to your chairmanship of our proceedings and to the firmness, fairness and humour that you will bring to the task. 
 Clause 2 is broad and, some fear, potentially all-encompassing. That is why we want to amend it. The Minister will be aware of both the content of the amendment and the fact that my noble Friends in another place tabled a similar amendment, the purpose of which is to ensure that Parliament retains—or perhaps I should say establishes—some leverage and control over what is issued to the authority. 
 On 1 March in another place, the amendment was tabled on Report. On that occasion, the Government's stance seemed equivocal. Lord Bassam seemed uncertain—and I put that as mildly, politely and understatedly as is my wont—whether the directions given by the Secretary of State to the SIA would be transparent. He said: 
``there will be very limited circumstances in which these confidential directions might be necessary.'' 
It was not clear to me that those limits were explained or explored. He continued: 
 ``Yes, they might relate to directions naming individuals or companies.'' 
However, he went on to tease us, inadvertently if not deliberately. He began by attempting to reassure us that 
``in the majority of cases—probably 99 per cent.—there will be transparency 
and went on to say: 
``in the majority of circumstances the directions should be a matter of public record . . . . We plan to establish the authority on the basis of a presumption of openness on the issue except in the limited and very sensitive circumstances that I have described.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 1 March 2001; Vol. 622, c. 1366-68.] 
 However, the point at which my hon. Friends and I cavil is that Lord Bassam referred to 
``limited and very sensitive circumstances'' 
but did not describe them in any meaningful or adequate sense, although he wrongly claimed to have done so. We are anxious to tease such a description out of the Government. If there is to be transparency in the great majority of cases—we will know what the directions are and they will be on the public record—why is that presumption not in the Bill? If it is 99 per cent. certain that everything will be public, or if it is certain that, in the ordinary course of events, 99 per cent. of the direction will be made public, where is the harm in assuring us of that by stating as much in the Bill? 
 It repays study if we examine the worthwhile but slightly curious debate in the other place, in which my noble Friends sought to establish what the Government had in mind, or to gain some reasonable example of the directions that they might issue. However, they were unable to get much information out of the Government. My noble Friend Viscount Astor emphasised the broad power in clause 2 for the Secretary of State to 
``give general or specific directions in writing to the authority'' 
as well as 
``the power to request information''. 
In the course of the debate, Viscount Astor asked the Under-Secretary why directions were required and whether they would be a matter of public record. In response, he got a Sir Humphrey-style answer. [Interruption.] Lord Bassam said: 
 ``I believe that the standard arrangement is for the Secretary of State to be able to give directions to non-departmental public bodies. If necessary, that could include the placing of a cap on fees.'' —[Official Report, House of Lords, 1 March 2001; Vol. 622, c. 1362.] 
If all that is involved is a cap on fees—

Charles Clarke: Sounds reasonable.

John Bercow: The Minister is chuntering from a sedentary position. There is no reason why such a cap on fees should not be stated in the Bill. If the power is to be permissive rather than prescriptive—a matter of concern to my hon. Friends and me— and a wider set of directions covering a broader range of topics may be issued, with necessarily greater power being conferred upon the Secretary of State, I politely tell the Minister that it is incumbent on him, as it was on Lord Bassam, to tell us what sort of information may be required of the authority and what sort of directions may typically be issued to it.

Nick Hawkins: I do not know whether my hon. Friend caught what I thought I heard the hon. Member for Lewisham, East (Ms Prentice) saying from a sedentary position, when he accurately described Lord Bassam's response as a Sir Humphrey-style reply. I think that she said ``Excellent.'' I am not sure whether that is an example of the training programme that Lord Bassam has been undergoing to make himself more like Sir Humphrey. It is interesting that a former Government Whip feels so strongly that Ministers should behave like Sir Humphrey Appleby rather than like Ministers.

John Bercow: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention, as I did not hear what the hon. Lady muttered. I thought that I was probably the poorer for being deprived of her words—if not words of wisdom, words of revelation. The right hon. Member for Walsall, South spoke earlier about symbiotic relationships. I am bound to say, as will become progressively clearer during the course of our exchanges, that my hon. Friend and I have a symbiotic relationship. He knows when I am in need of a useful nudge, which he has just provided.
 I want to develop important arguments—[Interruption.] However, I am, above all, courteous. Does the hon. Lady wish to intervene?

Joe Benton: Order. The hon. Lady in the Gallery is not part of the debate.

Bridget Prentice: There are so many hon. Ladies in the Room, Mr. Benton, that you are confusing me with my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department. I would hate the hon. Gentleman to have missed what I said, because the idea that I muttered something appals me. I did say ``Excellent'' in response to the comment about Sir Humphrey. The hon. Gentleman would benefit from watching that old BBC television series, which is currently being shown again. He would learn a great deal from Sir Humphrey if he did so.
Mr. Bercow rose—

Joe Benton: Order. The Committee should return to the amendment.

John Bercow: I do not seek to ape Sir Humphrey. I am always grateful for the kindly guidance of the hon. Lady, but as she knows, robustness, bluntness and specificity are my watchwords.
 I want to focus on what Lord Bassam said. I am not prepared to allow Labour Members to divert attention from his curious reply. He said: 
 ``Directions are not statutory instruments; they are merely a mechanism for a more informal way of establishing priorities and registering concerns''.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 30 January 2001; Vol. 621, c. 591.] 
He was seeking to reassure those who had expressed concerns by saying, ``Don't worry, this isn't an overarching imposition or a hefty jackboot of a statutory imposition. These are informal mechanisms.'' 
 Much of the debate so far has concerned the relationship between the SIA and the Secretary of State. That issue has been properly explored, whether the relationship is one of dependence, independence or, as the right hon. Member for Walsall, South interestingly, and perhaps appositely, suggested, one of mutual dependence or constructive interaction. I would like to think that that is the relationship that will evolve. However, it is important that we should know, in the overwhelming majority of cases, when directions are being issued by the Secretary of State, the matters on which they are being issued, the purposes for which they are being issued, and what, in those circumstances—which may vary—the word ``direction'' connotes. 
 My anxiety is that the Government assume, too often, that direction—something insisted on—is what is required. If, as the Minister emphasised, the Security Industry Authority will be carefully composed as a credible, authoritative and responsible body, it is not clear why, on a range of matters, it should regularly need to be subject to direction, as opposed to encouragement, consultation or open exchanges of opinion about what approach should be followed. 
 I did not find the words of Lord Bassam in the Official Report on 30 January at column 591 at all reassuring, even if they were intended to be so. I know that my noble Friends initially felt encouraged that he was seeking to reassure them that, in the vast majority of cases, information would be public, and there was nothing about which to be greatly concerned. I know that they went on to feel, as the debate progressed, that the Government were, if anything, backtracking on that commitment to openness, and seemed to be paving the way for a more wide-ranging and extensive issue of directions that would not be placed on the public record. That was a concern that my noble Friend Viscount Astor articulated at column 1362 on 1 March. He said that in Committee the Under-Secretary had been kind enough to say that he would reflect on the matter of public record. 
 However, my noble Friend was alarmed when, as he understood it, the Under-Secretary went back to the Home Office and all his natural inclinations for open and reasonable government deserted him, notwithstanding all his years of saying that the Labour party wanted more openness in government. My noble Friend was afraid that he had been subverted by the system. I shall not dilate on that point—because you will not like it, Mr. Benton—about which the hon. Member for Lewisham, East expressed such enthusiasm. 
 Lord Bassam said that he would write to my noble Friend Viscount Astor, and he did so, in his usual courteous fashion. However, the letter was rather extraordinary, because it appeared to be a total denial of what my noble Friend thought that Lord Bassam had previously stood for and argued. He reminded my noble Friend that he had acknowledged the arguments in favour of a general presumption of openness. However, he went on to say: 
 ``I remain of the view that there may be very limited circumstances in which the use of a confidential direction may be necessary.'' 
The only example that he went on to give was one in which directions may be required naming individuals or particular companies. He continued: 
``consequently we should not place a requirement on the face of the Bill for all directions under Clause 2 to be published.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 1 March 2000; Vol. 622, c. 1362.] 
I put it to the Minister of State—who will speedily have followed the argument—that that is a classic example of erecting an Aunt Sally and then knocking it down. My noble Friend did not make any such request or demand, or insist that there should be a requirement in the Bill for all directions to be published, but said that there should be a presumption that such directions should be published, which is perfectly reasonable. 
 As I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath believes, it is necessary for directions to be laid before each House of Parliament—we can no longer trust to luck. There has been much backsliding, hedging and prevarication by the Government, and we feel that any direction that is of sufficient public interest to require being stated in writing to the authority should also be of sufficient significance and public interest to be placed on record in Parliament. If the Minister can think of circumstances in which that would be prejudicial to the public interest, it would be helpful if he would explain—rather better than Lord Bassam did—what such circumstances would be. So far, we have not had much satisfaction from the Government on this matter. 
 There is an anxiety—which is the root of our amendment—that the Government do not seem to have much confidence in the authority that they have chosen to establish. Even before it has been created, the Minister appears to be saying that he is able to decide who gets a licence and who does not. In certain circumstances, he may direct the authority not to give someone a licence because he does not think that it should. I want to know what circumstances would cause a conflict between the Security Industry Authority and the Secretary of State, and what would justify the insistence of the latter on his point of view over and above the considered judgment of the authority appointed to make such assessments. If such circumstances can be envisaged, they should be explained to us now. If such conflicts are thought likely to arise in future, it is not unreasonable, if we believe in open government and the integrity of the SIA and of the relationship between it and the Secretary of State, to demand public explanations. That much we have not yet had from the Government. 
 The position seems even worse than I have so far described. I will probably be excoriated by my hon. Friends the Members for Surrey Heath and for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson) for my characteristic understatement of the case. I know that I tend to fall into that trap, but I am doing my best to speak up with some force on the matter, and they will no doubt encourage me. 
 The position seems worse than I have so far described because the Home Secretary may discover reasons why someone should not be given a licence—for example because that person has a criminal record. Under the Bill, the authority will have the right to acquire such information. It will be able to hold informal discussions with the Home Office and agree with the Home Secretary not to issue a licence. However, central Government have reserved the power to issue directions—not to have a discussion or a mutually beneficial interaction, but simply to insist. 
 I want to explore the point in some detail. I may have satisfaction from the Minister, but I have not had satisfaction from reading the debates in the other place. For the avoidance of doubt, let us remind ourselves of the terms of the clause. It states: 
 ``In carrying out its functions the Authority shall comply with any general or specific directions given to it in writing by the Secretary of State.'' 
It refers not merely to ``directions'' but to ``general or specific directions''. We must therefore assume that in some circumstances the Secretary of State expects—to deploy another word, I believe accurately—to insist on his preferred course, even if that course has not been decided on or has even been rejected by the Security Industry Authority. 
 I am unhappy about that. It is perfectly possible that someone could be refused a licence not because the Security Industry Authority decides that he or she is unsuitable to hold one, but because the Secretary of State has been reminded by officials that, under the clause, he can stamp his feet and issue a written instruction—``directions'' or ``instruction'' seem to be interchangeable terms in such circumstances—to the authority to that effect. 
 If that is not what the Government have in mind—I am prepared to accept that it might not be, although it is difficult to understand how it would not be—why is the Minister not prepared to give us an assurance by stating more explicitly in the Bill the extent of the perceived power of direction or the limits to it? When we are not told the specifics and a permissive power is provided that seems to be extremely wide, we become anxious that the power might be abused or, if not abused in the strict terms of the Bill and the entitlement that it confers, used for purposes for which we do not believe that it should be used. 
 In the same debate, my noble Friend Viscount Astor, at column 1366, asked the Under-Secretary to give an example of when the Home Secretary would give a direction relating to an individual. I emphasise that that could be a direction about which the individual himself or herself never learned. That is disturbing, because surely the first principle of natural justice is that a person against whom an adverse decision is made should know why. If he or she does not, it is difficult to understand how he or she can properly appeal. I do not see why the circumstances pertaining to that individual cannot be assessed by and adjudicated on by the authority. It is not clear why the Secretary of State needs to intervene. However, in response to my noble Friend Viscount Astor asking him to explain the matter, interestingly and curiously, Lord Bassam said: 
 ``The direction would not be: `Thou'—the SIA—`shalt not give a licence to'. In very limited circumstances the Secretary of State may ask for investigations to be made on sensitive issues with regard to companies about which there is concern. The Secretary of State may use that power to direct the SIA to carry out an investigation into a specific company where there is concern—perhaps a PSI equivalent of BCCI.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 1 March 2001; Vol. 622, c. 1367.] 
That is interesting. The Government were saying, ``Oh yes, there is a power of direction. We know that—general or specific—because it is in clause 2, but all we would be doing is directing the authority to conduct an investigation or to consider a factor that hitherto it had failed, through inadvertence or refusal, to consider.'' The Under-Secretary seemed to be trying to reassure my noble Friends that the direction would not insist on the granting or refusal of a licence to an individual. 
 We now come back to the issue to which we often return in our debates: the conflict between what is written in the Bill and Ministers' assurances. They assure us that the Bill sets out how they intend to proceed, but my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath and I are worried that such measures may not always be interpreted that way in practice. Why? Well, Ministers are not computers, although they occasionally make a good imitation of them. They are human beings and will vary. Some may adopt a relatively light-touch approach, some may take a middling approach and some may take a wide and comprehensive approach. I do not know which of the models offered by the right hon. Member for Walsall, South will be taken as their guiding light, but that could vary, and honourably so. 
 That is why we are worried that, if there were a potential for power to be used more widely than we would consider justified or consistent with the independence and integrity of the Security Industry Authority, caveats and safeguards should be put in place to ensure that that does not happen, whatever the legislative and directional appetite of the Secretary of State of the day. That, as yet, we do not have that assurance is a source of concern to me. 
 My noble Friend Viscount Astor went on to develop his point about the Secretary of State's power. He said that the directions not only give him the power to 
``direct that someone should not be given a licence, but they give him the power to give a secret direction to the authority to give someone a licence. Someone could get a licence because, on a whim, the Secretary of State feels that it is necessary. We will never know. The authority might be against the decision, but there will be nothing that it can do about it. It will have to comply.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 1 March 2001; Vol. 622, c. 1368-69.] 
I regard that as a central point. Will the Minister answer me head on about this subject? I am willing to concede that such action may not happen often. I accept that it might not happen at all, but it is conceivable that a situation could arise in which the Secretary of State thought that a particular individual—perhaps someone who had lobbied privately for the privilege—should be granted a licence, when the Security Industry Authority had come to a different view. 
 The Secretary of State of the day would issue either a general or specific direction, because he is empowered to do that under the terms of the unamended clause. In this context, it would be a specific direction: he might state that, although he recognises that the authority has judged that a licence should not be granted to the individual, he has access to information to which the authority is not privy, or he is better acquainted than the authority with the individual, and he insists that the authority provide a licence. 
 Would such information be in the public domain? Would the example that I have described be one of the 99 per cent. of cases that, Lord Bassam assured us, would be publicly recorded, or would reasons be invoked to justify withholding the information? Those are legitimate concerns. Although only a small number of cases might be affected, they would be of great importance to the individuals concerned, and they might reflect on the integrity and propriety of the procedures undertaken. 
 In the course of the debate to which I have referred, Lord Bassam said that 
 ``The Secretary of State cannot interfere in the judgment of the SIA. That is not the point. The noble Viscount''— 
Viscount Astor— 
``is assuming that the Secretary of State will simply tell the SIA not to give a licence.'' 
Equally, as I have argued, he could tell it to give a licence. Lord Bassam then states: 
 ``That is not what I am saying. I was very careful not to say that. That is the authority's judgment alone.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 1 March 2001; Vol. 622, c. 1369.] 
That was the Under-Secretary's statement, but it is merely his interpretation, as there is no reference point for it in the clause. 
 If it is intended that in no circumstances would the Secretary of State do more than direct that particular investigations take place, and that in no circumstances would he use a power—or even think that he had a power—to require the SIA to change a decision that it had reached, why does the clause not include an assurance to that effect? That is a simple point: indeed, as the late Enoch Powell would have said, it is so blindingly obvious that only an extraordinarily clever person could fail to grasp it. 
 This matter is of concern to my party, so I hope that the Minister will reflect seriously on it and provide an answer. The power is widely drawn and my party believes that it could be abused, and used in ways that the House does not understand. Perhaps the Minister will tell us how far he would involve himself in the mechanics of individual applications? I presume that he accepts that he could direct inquiries or investigations of particular individuals to be undertaken. If that is the case, why does he not also accept that if a Government did not agree with the conclusion of an authority's investigation, they could insist that it was changed? 
 Will the Minister tell us more than Lord Bassam did about the circumstances in which this broad power would be used? If he is prepared to set out in detail the circumstances that he or the Home Secretary envisage, we might be reassured. Is it a Henry VIII power? Will it allow the Secretary of State to direct the SIA to act contrary to its decisions, or in ways that might conflict with other parts of the Bill or other legislation? I am also concerned about the relationship between the directions and any other legislation that might be forthcoming, such as secondary legislation. If this wide power is to exist, surely the direction should, ordinarily, be placed before Parliament? 
 The following question begs itself: if the Secretary of State is to have such broad powers of direction, what, ultimately, is the purpose of having the security authority at all? I hope that that point is not reached. The Minister will recall that similar issues were raised concerning the Secretary of State's powers of direction in relation to the new national probation service during the debates on the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. I do not intend to do any more than animadvert in that way to that legislation, because you, Mr. Benton, would get upset if I dilated on it. However, I am worried that the Government are providing themselves with a broad power. 
 I believe that the Minister will accept that the power is broad. If he does, will he explain the legal constraints on its exercise? If, however, he is in an especially argumentative mood, which I hope he is not, and disputes that the power is broad—although it is difficult to understand how he could—and says that it is narrow and limited, there is no good reason why he should not now explain what the narrowness of the power entails and the strict limits on its exercise. Either way, there is no good reason why we should not have a rather better explanation of that intended exercise than Ministers have so far provided. It is on that basis—to raise legitimate anxieties about the scope of the clause—that I press the amendment.

Ronnie Fearn: I shall be brief, unlike the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow). Is one of the directions the timing of setting up the authority? Will that be the Secretary of State's first direction? If so, is there a time scale in mind?

Bruce George: I have no concerns about whether the directions given are published. In many cases, they should be. The question is when they should be published; at the time of the direction or in the annual report. It would be interesting to know the range of means by which the Home Secretary or the Minister of State will communicate the views of the Home Office and, I presume, other Government Departments, to the SIA. We are not creating an independent fiefdom of the private security industry or any other group of organisations. I would be appalled if the SIA regarded itself as separate from Government and able to do what it wanted and merely reported to the Home Secretary or Parliament annually.
 When I first became a Member of Parliament and my local councillors whinged that I was pinching a lot of their work by holding weekly surgeries, I wisely said that enough casework was available to keep us all fully engaged for a long time. Crime prevention is a sufficiently enormous job not only to keep the Home Office and its competent civil servants in jobs to retirement and way beyond, but to provide ample scope for the SIA. 
 The Home Secretary has an advantage that the chairman and chief executive of the SIA will not have. The Home Secretary will be aware of the activities in the Home Office, involving the police, civil servants and the fire service, and links with the intelligence services and other Departments. The scheme under which the SIA will, I presume, work will be much more limited and restricted to the private security industry in all its dimensions. 
 I envisage an enormous advantage for a Cabinet Minister and his deputy, who will have the organisational and informational breadth of activity to be able to communicate to the SIA in one of a variety of forms. One level will be through statutory instruments. For hon. Members who have not read it, I recommend the report by the House of Lords Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation in which it offered its wisdom on the Private Security Industry Bill, saying: 
 ``There is nothing in this Bill which the Committee wishes to draw to the attention of the House.'' 
Far more interesting is the evidence given to that House of Lords Committee by the Home Office, which lists all the different examples of when statutory instruments will be used and what response is available to the House of Commons and, I presume, the House of Lords. However, I do not speak as somebody with any experience of government. There is one person here who is in government, and he and the distinguished Secretary of State will know the methods by which their personal or departmental views will be communicated to an organisation that will be set up by the Home Office.

John Bercow: I welcome what the right hon. Gentleman said about transparency. However, with respect to him, we are debating not merely the communication of personal views, but a proposed amendment to a clause that confers a substantial power on the Secretary of State. In the light of what the right hon. Gentleman said about Ministers having access to certain information to which the SIA may not have access, will he say whether he thinks that the Secretary of State should be able to direct the granting of a licence to individuals, or the refusal to grant a licence? Does he think that that is what Ministers have in mind? If Ministers do have such things in mind, should they be open about it? That would be consistent with the right hon. Gentleman's comments about transparency.

Bruce George: I have no idea what is in my hon. Friend the Minister of State's mind at any stage, but I can imagine instances when it will be necessary for the Secretary of State to communicate sensitive information to the SIA.
 In Russia—this country is not in such a position—a high percentage of private security companies are run either by the KGB or criminal gangs. What if such an organisation set up a branch in this country for the purpose of investigation or to pursue people for the Russian Government? What if such a company wished to take over a British or European company using laundered money? The SIA may not have access to such information, but the heads of MI5 and MI6 would have a word in the ear of the appropriate Minister, who could then have a word in the ear of the chairman or chief executive of the SIA. I assume that that would not be committed to the public domain.

John Bercow: Why not?

Bruce George: Did I hear the hon. Gentleman correctly? I cannot argue any further; if he thinks that much information of such sensitivity should be put on the website—too much is, anyway—he is making a big mistake.

John Bercow: It would depend on the circumstances of the case. I say in all sincerity to the right hon. Gentleman—he knows that I respect his position—that I am concerned about establishing transparency, which he said that he supports. I accept that the right hon. Gentleman cannot predict what the Minister thinks, but is he saying that, because of the greater knowledge available to the Government, they should be able not only to communicate their view, but to insist on whether an individual should be granted a licence? If so, does he accept that that directly conflicts with what Lord Bassam of Brighton said in the other place? What is the Government's position, and can it be clearly established?

Bruce George: The Minister of State outranks his colleague in the House of Lords, and two months have elapsed since the House of Lords debates. All of us, not least those in the Home Office, are learning; the Home Office's interest in private security is a recent phenomenon.
 I do not want to give colleagues a lecture, because I am not competent to do so on this matter; I have never been and am not likely to be a Minister. However, there is a range of available methods. I recall attending a lunch at No. 10 when the then Prime Minister, Lady Thatcher, merely lifted her head to look in the direction of Charles Powell, and up he jumped. I am not aware of any words having passed her lips or any 
 gesticulation of either her left or right hand. It was merely a glance—no doubt a piercing one—that led to the intended reaction. There will be a whole range of methods of communication. Psychologists talk about the law of anticipated reaction; this leads to students dressing up as lawyers even when they are in their first year at university. People behave according to how they believe they should behave. 
 The Home Secretary will appoint the chairman in the first instance, so he should be reasonably compatible with the future incumbent of the office. I should be interested to know the range of methods of communication. Anyone who has been in the Government or who aspires to be in the Government knows that there is a range of methods and modes of communication that do not have to be absolutely formalised. The Conservative party has operated for centuries on that basis, as have all political parties. 
 I do not have the slightest anxiety about any malevolence on the part of Home Secretaries. Over the years, they have all been either competent or exceedingly competent. I have no worries that they are closet fascists, closet communists or mentally deranged. They have a great deal of input to make into the setting up, the workings and the future of the SIA. They will be the people who can integrate the various Government Departments. 
 I wrote an article about the myth of non-regulation, which, thankfully, no one read, because it countered the argument that I have been advancing for the past 25 years that there is no regulation in this area. In fact, there is an enormous amount of regulation and anyone who has been the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the Minister for Energy or a Secretary of State for Defence could explain exactly how much regulation in respect of the police or security operatives is outside the scope of the Bill.

John Bercow: Does the right hon. Gentleman believe that the Secretary of State should have the power to insist on the refusal or the granting of a licence?

Bruce George: I am not speaking for the Home Office. There may be exceptional cases when such action will be necessary. If I had sensitive information that had been derived from the United States, for example, about an individual, it would not be necessary for me to drag into my office the chairman of the SIA and say, ``You will not grant a licence to that individual because I have information from X intelligence agency in the United States that he is funded by the Russian or Italian mafia. He is an undesirable person. Although I am not telling you not to issue a licence, I shall leave you to look at the file to make your own judgment.'' In some circumstances, such action would not only be desirable, but absolutely necessary.
 I do not believe that such provisions will be abused. As the Minister of State said, the industry is evolving. In 20 years from now, the number of man guards will be far less because, regrettably or otherwise, technology will have supplanted them. The Home Office and other Government Departments must be able to change gear without coming back to Parliament to ask for new legislation and I believe that the Bill is sufficiently flexible to allow them to do that. 
 We will have the Home Affairs Committee, the Defence Committee, the statutory instrument process, parliamentary questions, private briefings with the Home Secretary, meetings with the chief executive or the chairman of the SIA and an annual report. There will be many opportunities for Members of Parliament to express their views without necessarily thinking that somewhere in the Home Office is a malevolent individual who is hell-bent on denying them the necessary information. 
 The Minister would be capable of providing more detail on many occasions, and that information could, quite legitimately, swiftly be made public. However, there must be many circumstances in the murky world of policing, national crime and international private security in which it is necessary for information that is transmitted not to find its way into the public domain. If the chief constable of any police authority were asked if he would be prepared for all communications to his officers or to the police authority to appear in the local newspaper, he would think that we were bonkers.

Ian Stewart: The hon. Member for Southport implied that the hon. Member for Buckingham had a mouth full of words, or that he raised simple but serious points. Is it not sensible to let the Minister answer them, because the other question, about whether the matter should be written into the Bill, is also impacted on by the fact that the official record of our debates can be used in courts and tribunals?

Bruce George: I think that I have said enough.

Charles Clarke: I enjoyed my right hon. Friend's contribution. I was a little distressed by what I can only describe as his revolutionary pessimism in saying that he thought that there was enough work to share between himself, his councillor colleagues and the rest of us. We in the Government had all hoped that after another term of the Labour Government we would have achieved utopia; there would be no complaints because we would have achieved a perfect society. I am disappointed that he does not share that ambition.
 On the points made by the hon. Member for Southport, I draw the Committee's attention to clause 26 (2), concerning commencement. It states: 
 ``The provisions of this Act, other than this section, shall come into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument appoint; and different days may be appointed under this subsection for different purposes.'' 
The process of kicking the thing off would be done by statutory instrument in the manner set out in the Bill. 
 The hon. Member for Buckingham made a speech in which, even more than usual, he made a tremendous mountain out of what is a small molehill. Some may say—I could not possibly—that that is his characteristic contribution to this Parliament. The power of direction in relation to a non-departmental public body is a standard provision in legislation, as we all know. It is the kind of provision that was available and was established in legislation passed by the previous Government for dealing with NDPBs. It is a routine process and I am surprised that so much could be made of it. 
 I will be clear; it is not the case that the Secretary of State can direct the SIA to issue or not issue a licence to a particular individual. A Secretary of State cannot issue such a direction. The licensing function is specifically conferred on the SIA and clearly set out in clauses 7 and 8. The power of direction cannot be exercised in such a way as to deprive the authority of its function. The power does not enable the Secretary of State to take over functions conferred on the authority by Parliament. That is important.

Peter Lilley: Is the Minister saying that the Secretary of State can only order the SIA to do things that it is not authorised to do by Parliament?

Charles Clarke: I am saying that the Act has the primacy. I do not know whether, in his time as a Secretary of State in the previous Government, the right hon. Gentleman put legislation through the House dealing with NDPBs, but the power exists specifically to allow directions to be made on issues such as what might be published in the annual report of the organisation or on a range of such functions. It is a general power. The explicit meaning of the Act is that it is the responsibility of the NDPB—in this case, the Security Industry Authority—to carry out the responsibilities set out in clause 1 in the ways elaborated on throughout the Bill. It is the authority's responsibility; it is not the prerogative of the Secretary of State to usurp that authority.

John Bercow: The Minister accused me—unworthily, although entirely typically—of trying to make a mountain out of a molehill. I was doing nothing of the kind. I was airing legitimate concerns, as I will continue to do at every stage—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Weaver Vale (Mr. Hall) can chunter and be smug from a sedentary position if he so wishes, but it will not discourage me from the pursuit of that duty.
 Will the Minister acknowledge that what he is saying is argument by advocacy and not by evidence? He is simply asserting that there is no power to grant or to refuse a licence. How does he explain the conflict between that assertion and the fact that in subsection (1) of the unamended clause 2 we are told that the authority shall comply with any ``general or specific directions'' given to it in writing by the Secretary of State? It does not make an exception in relation to decisions on the granting or non-granting of licences.

Charles Clarke: The point that the hon. Gentleman has not understood is that a series of functions are set out for the SIA in clause 1, including the power to grant or not grant licences. It is the SIA that, under the legislation passed by this Parliament, will have the legal authority to carry those matters through. It would not be right or appropriate for a Secretary of State to seek to usurp that function. If he turns his attention to clauses 7 and 8, he will see that the Secretary of State does have certain functions in relation to the operations set out, which we shall debate later. That demonstrates clearly that there are issues in relation to criteria. Clause 7(5) states:
 ``Criteria or revised criteria set out under this section shall not have effect for the purposes of this Act unless the Secretary of State has approved them.'' 
The Secretary of State therefore performs certain roles, which are set out, but they do not include the ability to usurp the responsibility given to the SIA by an Act of Parliament.

Peter Lilley: Is the Minister saying that subsection (1) cannot be used in the way suggested—for example, to direct the SIA not to give a licence to a company when, for security reasons, it is known that it would be inappropriate to do so? What he has told the Committee would rule that out. Clearly, that is not what was previously understood by the Committee. That would seem to be one of the few occasions on which the clause would be justified without the amendment for which my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham has so eloquently argued.

Charles Clarke: I am saying that the power does not exist in precisely the way indicated. I thought that my right hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South was saying—he will correct me if I misunderstood—that information, influence and opinions are spread throughout Government by a multiplicity of different means. He was not approving the stare of Baroness Thatcher, as it were, but simply describing what he had seen. There are many such areas, as he suggested. If the right hon. Gentleman is asking whether the Secretary of State has a right to direct the authority to issue or not issue a licence to a particular individual or company, the answer is no.

Nick Hawkins: I am listening carefully to the Minister, but does he not recognise that what he is setting out as the Government's position is directly contrary to the letter that his ministerial colleague, Lord Bassam, wrote to my noble Friends in relation to the Bill? The terms of that letter were set out by my noble Friend Viscount Astor at column 1362 of the Official Report on 1 March 2001. It stated:
 ``I remain of the view that there may be very limited circumstances in which the use of a confidential direction may be necessary, for example, directions naming individuals or particular companies and consequently we should not place a requirement on the face of the Bill for all directions under Clause 2 to be published''. 
That is a quotation from a ministerial letter relating to the clause. It is specific about what the Government were taking power to do.

Charles Clarke: I had planned to address that matter later. The hon. Gentleman has misunderstood—although not, I think, maliciously—the point that has been made. As my noble Friend stated, it is conceivable that a Secretary of State might feel sufficiently concerned about the activities of particular individuals or companies to direct the SIA to investigate them. There is a difference between that and the argument erected by the hon. Member for Buckingham, which concerned the issuing of licences against SIA decisions, and therefore usurping its power. If I have not sufficiently dealt with that matter I will give way later, but I want to make more progress in addressing the points that have been made.
 As I indicated earlier, if directions are given, they are likely to relate to relatively routine matters, or conceivably to sudden or unusual circumstances to which the Secretary of State wants the SIA to respond, perhaps swiftly: he might be sufficiently concerned about the activities of particular individuals or companies to decide to ask the SIA to investigate them. I am not suggesting that those are likely scenarios, but a prudent Government would wish to be able to address them if they arose. If a directive were to be given about the activities of an individual or company, making it public at the outset might defeat the objective of achieving a confidential report. The hon. Member for Buckingham asked whether there were cases in which a directive should not be made public, and I suggest that that is one such example. 
 The Government believe that in the overwhelming majority of cases it would be right, and a matter of course, for directions to be placed in the public domain at the time that they are made, but that there are circumstances in which that might not be right. 
 My noble Friend Lord Bassam did not fully describe the limited and sensitive circumstances in the letter to which the hon. Member for Surrey Heath referred, because they are likely to be so rare and unusual that it is difficult to conceive of them. He suggested that, although it might be necessary to direct that there should be an investigation, it might be prejudicial to make that direction public at the outset. 
 Finally, I want to offer a little commercial for the Government. We passed the Freedom of Information Act 2000. That empowers individuals by enabling them to request to see directions when they arise, as all information held by public authorities is covered by the Act. That is another weapon in the armoury that my right hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South described when he was discussing parliamentary actions that can be taken in particular areas. The Government put that weapon on the statute book. Its practical effect is to enable the public to look directly at situations and to place information in the public arena. 
 It is also important to take account of the Act's disqualifications: one of its exclusions concerns instances when disclosure is prejudicial to the conduct of public affairs. I am trying to describe an example of that. A direction to look at a particular individual or company could be prejudicial to the effective conduct of public affairs, so the situation should be allowed to stand as it is. That is the basis on which I ask the Committee to consider the amendment, and on which I ask for it to be withdrawn or voted down.

Nick Hawkins: I have listened to the Minister's attempts to resolve the conflict between what he is saying with the contents of his noble Friend's letter. My noble Friend Viscount Goschen said:
 ``I understand the natural desire of Home Office officials to issue the Minister with a `get out of gaol free card' to sew into the lining of the back pocket of his coat for some eventuality that may arise in the future which had not been considered.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 1 March 2001; Vol. 622, c. 1365.] 
That is an accurate description of the Minister's argument, which is that he cannot anticipate future circumstances, but in case the Security Industry Authority is not able to listen to informal advice a future Secretary of State may have to issue a direction. If that were the case, should we in Parliament not know about it? That is precisely the point of the amendment.

Charles Clarke: That is a point for the hon. Gentleman to make in his winding-up speech. I was asked to give examples. They ranged from the relatively trivial direction to include certain uncontroversial aspects in the annual report to the possibly delicate and sensitive direction to investigate a particular company or individual. I acknowledge that that would be a rare circumstance. It would not necessarily be in the public interest for such a direction to be in the public arena, because that would of itself inhibit the purpose of the direction and the activities of the authority.
 I do not accept the universality of the amendment. Let us suppose that certain information—whether from the security services, which is unlikely, or from any other source—causes an investigation into a particular security company. If such information were made public, the criminals in that company would cover their tracks before they could be examined properly. I cannot accept that that is in the public interest. That is why I reject the amendment, which, in such circumstances, favours telling the criminals beforehand that they are about to be investigated. That is not a good way in which to proceed. I urge the hon. Member for Buckingham to withdraw the amendment. If he is not willing to do so, I shall ask the Committee to vote against it.

John Bercow: The Minister of State was at his least convincing. He said that the power is relatively narrow. We fear that, by contrast, it is broad. The right hon. Member for Walsall, South declined to say whether he thought the power was narrow or broad, but he explained why he can envisage circumstances in which a relatively broad power would be justified. That is at the heart of the matter. The right hon. Gentleman, in explaining that it might be legitimate and desirable in certain circumstances for the Secretary of State to require the authority not to issue a licence, invoked more information being made available to the Secretary of State by comparison with the free-standing Security Industry Authority.
 In effect, the right hon. Gentleman said that he did not know exactly what the Minister was thinking, but looking at the matter from a common-sense point of view, it seemed that from time to time the Government will have access to information about individuals or companies that will not be available to the Security Industry Authority. He said that, in such circumstances, the Government ought to be able to say to the authority, ``We have this information. We are happy to tell you what it is either in detail or in general terms, and you should not issue a licence.'' He went so far as to say that he thought that such cases would be so obvious and incontrovertible that the authority would not argue about them. However, he conceded that, even if the authority were minded to argue about the matter, the Secretary of State should be able to insist on his decision being taken. 
 The stance of the right hon. Gentleman is eminently respectable. He went on to defend it. In fairness, it is a different stance from that of the Minister, which is murkier and less defensible. I do not want to be uncharitable. I have been more than charitable to the Minister in previous Standing Committees, but I have greater regard for the candour of the right hon. Member for Walsall, South than for his. In a poor and unconvincing winding-up speech, he simply argued by advocacy, not evidence. My right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr. Lilley) speedily picked up on that. The Minister just said that the Security Industry Authority has the power and responsibility for decisions about licences. That is not supposed to be the business of the Secretary of State. 
 Clauses 7 and 8 describe the powers available to the SIA that, admittedly, relate to licensing. What makes hon. Members think that the Secretary of State would wish to interfere in that process, or could do so? The answer, which is why my hon. Friends and I are minded to press the amendment, is the broad and potentially all-embracing power that the Government have decided to confer on themselves in the unamended clause. 
 The hon. Member for Eccles made an interesting point about the admissibility of evidence and proceedings that could be invoked in cases of conflict that go to the courts. I acknowledge that, but we must have an overwhelming concern about what is in the Bill, rather than the utterances on a particular occasion by a given Minister who, by definition, whatever his or her merits and whether he or she is destined to go upwards or downwards, is a here today and gone tomorrow—or the day after tomorrow—Minister. What matters is what is in the Bill. [Interruption.] I am grateful for the encouragement of my right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden. He has taken many Bills through the House—rather more than any other member of the Committee. I am concerned by the specific reference to ``general or specific directions'' given to the authority by the Secretary of State. 
 Apart from transparency, scope is the central point about which I am overwhelmingly concerned. The Minister said, in response to the invocation of my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath of the comments of Lord Bassam, that the reference to particular individuals or companies is simply a reference to the power that would be taken to direct an investigation. I should be grateful for the Minister's attention at this point because, if I am to criticise his argument, as I shall, it would be helpful if he would confirm what his argument is. 
 The Minister seemed to say that there would a power to provide that the Security Industry Authority ``should look at'' a particular individual or company. When challenged by my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath, he insisted that the power did not go beyond that: the Secretary of State could insist that someone should be investigated or examined in more detail, but he could not insist on the primacy of his judgment over that of the authority. However, the problem with that is that it is not what the unamended clause states. If the Minister is adamant that the Secretary of State would in no circumstances insist on his view over that of the authority, why does it not say so in the clause?

Charles Clarke: The reason that I accused the hon. Gentleman of making a mountain out of a molehill—I have difficulty maintaining an active attention when he goes through the matter in such a pettifogging way—is that if he examines clause 1(2)(a), he will note that it states that the functions of the authority shall be
``to carry out the functions relating to licensing and approvals that are conferred on it by this Act''. 
That is a function of the authority, not of the Secretary of State. That is the point.

John Bercow: Actually, that is not the point. First, let me deal with the nonsense about pettifogging. The Minister ought to understand—let him learn it once and for all—that it is precisely the responsibility of the Committee to scrutinise the Bill in detail. If he is so obviously preoccupied with his ascent up the greasy pole of politics that he does not understand that that responsibility is incumbent not only on Opposition members of the Committee but on every member, it is time that he learned that. That is the first point, of which the hon. Member for Weaver Vale, who frankly does not understand much of what we are debating, does not have the slightest comprehension.
 Secondly, clause 1, to which the Minister referred in defence of his position, confers the responsibility on the authority but does not make it clear that it is its exclusive responsibility. Sure enough, responsibilities are granted to and powers are conferred on the Security Industry Authority, but the Bill does not state that the matter is exclusively the authority's concern and that in no circumstances can the directional power of the Secretary of State touch on the exclusive discretion of the authority in granting or not granting licences. If that is how the Secretary of State wants us to understand the matter, it is incumbent on the Government to draft their legislation such that the matter can brook no doubt, but they have not chosen to do so.

Peter Lilley: Is my hon. Friend aware that not only does the Bill not exclusively give the SIA that authority, but clause 13 states:
 ``The Secretary of State may by order make provision for local authorities to carry out some or all of the Authority's relevant licensing functions''?

John Bercow: That is a helpful additional point on which I had not focused. It directly cuts across, contradicts and undermines the Minister's claim that these are matters only for the authority. They are matters for the authority, but that is not the same as saying that they are matters only for the authority.
 The Minister says that the investigation is all that the Secretary of State has the power to direct. The trouble is that that is inconsistent with the perfectly reasonable point made by the right hon. Member for Walsall, South that the Secretary of State might have information provided to him by agencies that is not available to the Security Industry Authority. On the strength of that information, he might want to advise or direct the authority to grant or not to grant a licence. The Minister said a few moments ago by way of a subordinate clause of a sentence that it was unlikely that information about a particular individual or company would reach the Secretary of State via the intelligence services, although he did not explain why he thought that. I hope that he would accept that it is possible that such information might reach the Secretary of State and cause him to doubt a judgment reached by the SIA without that information being available to it. 
 If the Minister and his Department have come into possession of information that the SIA does not have, does the Minister not understand that in such circumstances the Department would not be asking the authority to conduct an investigation? In such circumstances, the SIA would not be the appropriate authority to conduct an investigation, because it would be doing so without information that the Secretary of State had and that made him believe that he was in a better position to reach a decision. Why then can the Minister not understand that a Secretary of State might want to insist on his preference, as opposed to that of the inadequately informed Security Industry Authority? 
 It is perfectly imaginable that such a scenario could arise. Interestingly, the Government, who are breathtakingly arrogant about such matters, are hypersensitive. Perhaps that is because we sometimes attack them, justifiably, with some vigour. 
 I am perfectly prepared to concede that a scenario such as the right hon. Member for Walsall, South describes could arise. Ministers might have information provided to them that the SIA does not have. In such circumstances, they would not be asking for an investigation to be conducted. They would probably be saying that, given the incontrovertible information that they have, a licence should not be granted: ``Please do not do so'', or ``Thou shalt not do so.'' I am saying not that that is necessarily objectionable but that such a scenario is likely to arise, so the Minister should be prepared to clarify the extent of the power in the Bill. He should not pretend that a situation might or might not arise, or that the Government are proposing to confer on themselves a lesser power than that which they are intent on conferring.

Charles Clarke: I simply wanted to kill off the red herring that the right hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden raised in relation to clause 13. It is the point that I have been seeking to make throughout my response to this debate. Clause 13 states:
 ``The Secretary of State may by order make provision for local authorities to carry out some or all of the Authority's relevant licensing functions in relation to such cases and such areas, and for such purposes, as may be specified or described in the order.'' 
Clause 13(3) describes the order referred to. It states that such an order may 
``impose such conditions and requirements in respect of the carrying out of any of the Authority's relevant licensing functions by a local authority as the Secretary of State thinks fit''. 
The point that it makes is that the Secretary of State's ability to make an order is within the context of the remit of the authority as a whole. There are many local authority licensing schemes, for example, in relation to bouncers at nightclubs, in respect of which it may be appropriate for the local authority to continue that role. As is made clear, the Secretary of State's power is within the context of the overall responsibility of the SIA, under clause 1, to carry out that function. The Secretary of State must act within that framework.

John Bercow: That is very interesting, but I do not think that the Minister has even managed to persuade himself. He certainly has not persuaded any sensible, dispassionate and attentive member of the Committee, although I recognise that that excludes a substantial number of Committee members, who are not interested in the details of the argument at all.

Mike Hall: That is so arrogant.

John Bercow: The hon. Gentleman chunters from a sedentary position, but he has not followed the argument, and does not understand the point. He cannot recognise the conflict between the Minister's assertions and the terms of the Bill, which confer extensive power. That is the reality.

Ian Stewart: I have been following the argument, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman recognises. I ask him to withdraw one comment: he asserted earlier, as I am sure the record will show, that the Bill does not, as my hon. Friend the Minister said, provide the SIA with the power to give or not give licences. I hope that he did not mean to imply that, but that provision is in clause 1(2).

John Bercow: I absolutely concede that. The record is always the exclusive arbiter in such matters, but I certainly intended to give no such impression. If the hon. Gentleman looks at the record, I think that he will see that I did not say that. Of course the provisions of the Bill empower the Security Industry Authority to make decisions on such matters. However, I did say—which may have led him to make his observation—that the terms of the Bill do not make it clear that that is the exclusive preserve of the SIA. In fact, I used the word ``only'' in that regard—the Bill does not make it clear that that is a matter only for the SIA. If the Minister is suggesting that that is the case, there is no reason why we should not have the additional safety net of including such an assurance in the Bill.
 I am disappointed by the Minister's comments, because he has not provided a justification of his position. The power could be more widely used—I am not even arguing that it would be used for bad purposes—but he is trying to argue that it is a relatively limited power, and that all that is possible is the direction to the authority to investigate. It is more likely that the Government imagine that they have a reserve power to insist on their point of view. If that is what they want, and what they recognise that they might wish to exercise, the matter should be debated on its merits—on the basis of whether it is a good or bad idea—and the Bill should state clearly that that is what the Government have in mind. As it stands, the clause is worryingly broad. It is open to use for purposes that the Government are not acknowledging, let alone defending. That is an unsatisfactory state of affairs because it does not make for clarity of law, which is what we should seek to establish. The Minister's concluding remarks were unsatisfactory, and I urge my right hon. and hon. Friends to support the amendment.

Peter Lilley: I had not intended to speak in this debate, but I have been stirred to do so by the case that has been made by my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham.
 The Committee's duty is to scrutinise the legislation: its task is to establish the Bill's meaning and to ensure that it will achieve what we want it to achieve. The Minister, perhaps a little flustered by the difficulties that he experienced in adequately explaining the meaning of the clause, described the scrutiny that it was receiving as pettifogging. So be it. It is our duty to establish the meaning of the Bill clause by clause. 
 I entered Parliament with the objective of trying to limit the powers of Government and to minimise the discretion of Ministers, ensuring that where discretion has to be exercised, Ministers are accountable and transparent in their actions. The clause appears to give very broad powers to Ministers: it gives them discretionary powers and it does not make them transparently accountable to the House in the exercise of those powers. The amendment would at least set right some aspects of those discretionary powers by making the exercise of them transparent. 
 Two issues have emerged in the course of the debate. First, is it reasonable to give such powers to the Secretary of State? Secondly, does the clause give him those powers, as it appears to, or does it not, for the reasons given by the Minister? 
 There is a reasonable case for giving the Home Secretary those powers. That was explained by the right hon. Member for Walsall, South. Circumstances could arise in which the Home Secretary was in possession of information from the security services that he could not divulge, even to the SIA, because it would compromise the sources from which he obtained it, but that made it advisable in the public interest that the SIA be directed not to license a particular firm. 
 Those powers were not on the statute book when I was Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. However, three weeks after I was appointed to the post, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and we possessed information that there were two or three companies in this country that were beneficially owned by the Kuwaiti authorities, so I had to act to nationalise those companies. That was an uncharacteristic decision, and I was probably the last Conservative Minister to nationalise a company, but an exceptional power was on the statute book, and on that occasion it was necessary to exercise it in the national interest. 
 It might be the case that the Bill gives the Home Secretary similar exceptional powers to exercise in the national interest. If the Minister had come to the Committee and said that that was the case, we would have listened sympathetically, although we would also have tried to restrict and limit the exercise of those powers to particular circumstances. We would have wanted to ensure that his actions were as accountable and transparent as possible, but we might have accepted that there was a case for no transparency in such circumstances: for example, the Secretary of State might wish to exercise those powers without that being known to a criminal or a foreign hostile power. 
 There is a case for the clause as it stands. However, the Minister said that the Bill does not give the Secretary of State the power to direct the SIA specifically and generally and that he was not taking the power to direct the SIA to do anything that it is empowered to do under the Bill. He intervened to make such an extraordinary statement. It can mean only that he is taking powers to direct the SIA to do things that it is not empowered to do under the Bill. When I said that to him, he floundered. 
 My question needs answering. The Home Secretary will have the power to direct the SIA either to take action that it is empowered to do under the Bill, or to do things that it is not empowered to do under the Bill. We can rule out the latter. It could not be possible for the Home Secretary to have powers to direct the SIA to do things that it is not able to do, but it is possible that the Bill grants the Home Secretary the power to direct the SIA to do things that it is empowered to do, and to tell it specifically which way to jump. 
 The Minister said that the Home Secretary could tell the SIA to carry out an investigation. It is not clear to me how he can read that into that lucid wording of clause 2(1), which states: 
 ``In carrying out its functions the Authority shall comply with any general or specific directions given to it in writing by the Secretary of State.'' 
Why should the SIA respond to the Secretary of State if he asks it to undertake an inquiry, but not if he asks it to reach a particular conclusion at the end of that inquiry? I know of no legal maxims or case law that would justify the extraordinary assertion of the Minister that the clause does not mean what it appears to mean. He made that assertion off the top of his head.

John Bercow: I understand and entirely endorse my right hon. Friend's point. Does he not agree that if the Secretary of State had available to him, courtesy of the Security Service or others, damning information that the SIA did not possess, he would in those circumstances not even be directing that an investigation should take place? He would be directing that, in the light of that additional intelligence, someone who would otherwise have been granted a licence should not be granted a licence. Why does the Minister not own up to that fact? It is so obvious.

Peter Lilley: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Does the wording of clause 2(1) empower the Secretary of State to tell the SIA what to do and what type of action it can take? A quick perusal of the Bill, which I had not previously committed to memory, shows that clause 9 refers to
 ``The power of the Secretary of State to prescribe the conditions on which a licence must be granted and the power of the Authority to impose additional conditions''.
 The Secretary of State has a lot of power. Clause 13 states: 
 ``The Secretary of State may by order make provision''. 
The Minister attempted to argue that the Bill implies that the Secretary of State can only take certain action without curtailing the authority's power to make decisions. Yet clause 13 states that the Secretary of State can take away from the authority the power to make decisions and give it to other bodies. That shows that it is reasonable for us to interpret clause 2(1) as requiring the authority to exercise its functions in a specific way. 
 To reach such conclusions, the Minister of State must have lost touch with the use of the English language and be in an Alice in Wonderland-type world where words mean what he says they will mean. What wording would he have to insert into the Bill to give the Home Secretary the power to direct the authority to comply with a direction to refuse a licence to a particular company? In other words, how would he word a clause to mean the same as clause 2 seems to mean to every member of the Committee—except him—and those in another place who have discussed the matter, including his colleagues? If he is saying that it is impossible to find a form of words that would enable the Home Secretary to have such a power, he has just shot himself in both feet and he had better return to the Committee in a more reasonable frame of mind after lunch. 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 The Chairman, being of the opinion that the principle of the clause and any matters arising thereon had been adequately discussed in the course of debate on the amendment proposed thereto, forthwith put the Question, pursuant to Standing Orders Nos. 68 and 89, That the clause stand part of the Bill. 
 Question agreed to. 
 Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3 - Conduct prohibited without a licence

John Bercow: I beg to move amendment No. 43, in page 2, line 31, at end insert—
 `(1A) For the purposes of subsection (2), ``licensable conduct'' includes only conduct which is carried out in return for payment.'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to take amendment No. 44, in page 2, line 31, at end insert—
 `(1A) For the purposes of subsection (2), ``licensable conduct'' includes only conduct which is carried out in return for payment in excess of such amount as may be specified by order made by the Secretary of State.'.

John Bercow: Amendment No. 43 is designed to clarify the clause and to demonstrate beyond doubt that licensable conduct is conduct that is carried out in return for payment. Amendment No. 44 is a little more explicit. Both amendments concern issues that were raised in another place on 30 January by my noble Friends at columns 604-609 of the Official Report. We are anxious to probe a legitimate issue. How far down the scale is it intended that the Bill should reach in terms of licensable conduct? Obviously, it will include firms that supply security guards on contract in return for payment. We come again to the issue of whether something is permissive but broad, or explicit and limited. As the unamended clause stands, we do not know how tightly drawn the proposal is, which is why the amendments are designed to establish beyond doubt that what is involved is conduct that is carried out in return for payment.
 I think that the Government are inclined to argue that that is what they have in mind, but it is not clear from the Bill that that is what is permitted. Firms that provide security guards on contract in return for payment are covered, but how far will the clause extend into the grey areas of licensable conduct? Let us consider, for example, someone who is unpaid or someone who is paid a small sum to look after the door at a local event, perhaps in extremis; in circumstances that could not have been envisaged beforehand. The sum involved might be small—£5, for example—but would such a circumstance be covered? That is not entirely clear. 
 How will the Bill affect people who may perform security-related activities on a one-off basis and without payment. In another place, my noble Friend Lord Cope of Berkeley cited the example of someone acting as a door supervisor at a charity jumble sale. Would such a person be caught by the provisions of the Bill? I want to establish not Ministers' personal preference as to the interpretation of the clause, but what, on legal advice and justification, they are at liberty to say that the Bill allows. 
 How will churchwardens and other volunteers who might have a security role be affected? It may be that, at the event in question, their exclusive duty—not even their main one—is to act in a security capacity, even though their normal role is that of churchwarden or another similar, or dissimilar, function. In such circumstances, would the exemptions in schedule 2 be sufficient to stop them being affected? 
 How would the provisions of schedule 2—which, clearly, is inextricably bound up with the consideration of this clause and amendments thereto—relate to someone who held his or her neighbour's house keys and otherwise looked after his or her neighbour's house while that neighbour went on holiday? Would such a person be covered by the existing wording? The answer is probably that the Government would not want that, but how can we be sure beyond doubt that the provisions of the Bill could not be so extended, for example, if the house were especially large, and the burden of responsibility were considered especially great, not least if the property in question had been subject to professional criminal invasion on previous occasions? We need to be sure that such a person would not be caught by the provision, because that person might have a primary and even exclusive responsibility for guarding that property for the period in question. Would he or she be covered? If not, how can we be certain? 
 I am aware that Lord Bassam of Brighton went some way towards seeking to assuage those concerns on 13 January. Will the Minister not only assure us that the Bill is not intended to catch the sorts of activities that I have described, but, as Minister of State at the Home Office, assure us unequivocally that its scope could not, under any circumstances, be so extended? It is not yet clear that we have received an assurance of that kind. 
 The Minister, characteristically but equally unfairly, accused me earlier of making a mountain out of a molehill. I was doing nothing of the kind; as he knows, I will never be dissuaded from exploring legitimate issues on behalf of my hon. Friends simply because of such downmarket, low, music hall abuse. However, the point can be made, and has been made, simply. I hope that the Minister can provide the reassurance sought. On the strength of that explanation, I rest content that I have made the point that I wish to make.

Rosie Winterton: I want to speak briefly on the matter, because I fear that my constituents, who have suffered at the hands of wheelclampers, would be distressed by the amendment. Indeed, they would be so distressed that I am not sure that they should be told about it, but I fear that I may have to inform them of the actions of the Conservative party. They would be distressed because the amendment would allow wheelclamping to continue as at present, as many wheelclampers are not paid by the landowners from whose property they operate.
 On Second Reading, Opposition Members expressed concerns about the activities of wheelclampers and I thought that they understood why it was necessary to license them. I also thought that they were aware that, frequently, landowners allow wheelclampers to operate on their land but do not employ or pay them, and they make it clear that that is the case. I fear that wheelclampers give under-the-counter money to landowners in return for being allowed to operate on their land, which is why the amendment was tabled in the other place. Landowners must take responsibility for what happens on their land. 
 I fear that the amendment will give wheelclampers free rein to carry on as before. As they are not paid for the hours that they work, they must collect fees and fines from the drivers of the cars that they clamp.

Charles Clarke: I hope that I will be able to give reassurances concerning wheelclamping that my hon. Friend will find useful with regard to the arguments in her constituency. She has long campaigned about the problem, and she is right to point out that the Opposition's amendment could inhibit our ability to deal with it.
 The amendment would build into the definition of ``licensable conduct'' the condition that it must be undertaken in return for payment in excess of a sum that the Secretary of State would prescribe by secondary legislation. That is intended to protect volunteers and others from regulations, and to protect small businesses from disproportionately costly legislation. I applaud that aim. Such concerns were key reasons why so many consultations were held concerning the Bill and the preceding White Paper. 
 First, I will deal with people who might undertake relevant activities but are not remunerated, such as churchwardens—an example that the hon. Member for Buckingham mentioned—someone who is working unpaid for a school, or the neighbour who is a key holder. Such people will not be regulated. The Bill is directed at people who provide services under contract, or who are employed in-house, such as door supervisors and wheelclampers. Such matters are covered in clause 3 and schedule 2. 
 The licensing arrangements do not apply to the majority of people who undertake the activities of a security operative on a no-contract or reward-free basis: the main exception is wheelclampers, and I will deal with that issue later. I hope that the hon. Member for Buckingham will accept my assurance that the kinds of people about whom he was expressing concern are not covered by the Bill. 
 To refer to a previous discussion about an earlier clause, the Bill also does not apply to people who carry out security-related activities that are incidental to their main employment, such as people who work with schools, churches or registered charities. However, if a school, church or charity were to hire security operatives under contract, it is right that it should expect the company contracted to have been vetted to a national standard, and licensed. If the security operatives used were employed in-house, they would be exempted from the licensing requirement and it would be the organisation's responsibility to vet its own staff. 
 One may imagine a school fete, which would be a substantial event with many people attending during a weekend. The school may decide that the best way to police such an event would be to bring in a company under contract for the afternoon. We believe that such a company should be covered so that the school may know that the company is reputable. I recall a St. Trinian's film about a school fete in which the contractors brought in were criminals—the hon. Member for Buckingham will know of the St. Trinian's types—and worked with the girls at the school to engage in illicit activities. I think that St. Trinian's school would have been much happier if the security company had been properly regulated.

John Bercow: With respect to the Minister's slightly unnecessary aside, my experience of such matters is confined to Finchley Manorhill comprehensive school in Finchley. I cannot comment on his public school experiences.
 I took on board the Minister's comments about charitable functions. Can I establish that he is not arguing—or, if he is, that he can justify it himself—that a contract always either implies or presupposes remuneration? Is he not prepared to admit that there are circumstances in which a contractual arrangement may not involve payment?

Charles Clarke: I have not addressed that point before now. I have always assumed that a contract involves payment for services rendered, although it may be indirect. Would someone provide a service to another—in whatever form and whatever the nature of the contract—for love or whatever? I do not know, but I will consider the matter.

John Bercow: I am talking about the charitable context.

Charles Clarke: I understand that. The only exception to the general principle that I have described relates to the special case of wheelclamping. In that case only, the clause extends regulatory controls to others, such as landowners and those acting on their behalf, where they do not use a licensed contractor, but do their own clamping and charge a release fee. In case what I said on Second Reading in column 1058 should lead to any misunderstanding, I wish to make it clear that volunteers who engage in wheelclamping that involves a release fee would need a licence.
 I turn to the exemption of activities below a level at which the Secretary of State would prescribe; the small business issue. During our consultations, we were warned about the dangers of excess regulation and cost, and we do not intend to go down that road. Regulation must be consistent, and it would be confusing and difficult to administer the exemption of small businesses from licensing. However, most importantly, that would exempt some of the businesses that are the source of much of the public disquiet that the Bill seeks to address. It is generally not the big reputable firms that harass the public by employing violent or abusive door supervisors, or who demand money with menaces from innocent wheelclamped motorists, but small companies, organisations and individuals who are the furthest from a reputable and non-criminal practice and must be regulated. 
 Under the amendment, a small company could be exempt from licensing because it carried out small jobs below the envisaged reward threshold, but would need to be licensed for a bigger job above any threshold that we put forward. The confusion involved in that could be a genuine difficulty. I acknowledge the need to protect small businesses, but the Bill is balanced, targeted and, generally, welcomed by the industry. I hope that I have provided clarification, and that the amendments will be withdrawn.

John Bercow: I am rather more encouraged by the Minister's response to this set of amendments than I was by his response to amendment No. 19, and we do not intend the press the amendments. I should be grateful if he would consider seriously my point about contracts that do not require payment or other remuneration.
 The Minister mentioned small-scale events, such as a person who undertakes to protect a house. His comments struck me on the whole as being reassuring, although I should like to examine them again in the Official Report. We may return to the matters at a later date if we are not fully satisfied, but the thrust of his comments was encouraging and satisfactory. 
 I point out, as I regularly do—I say this as a matter of pride to the hon. Member for Doncaster, Central—that I am not a lawyer. I cannot be absolutely certain that our amendments would not have the effect that she describes, but I do not believe that they would, and they are certainly not intended to do so. I do not believe that she is right. Her point about landowners permitting wheelclampers to operate on their land but not paying them is true, but it does not meet my point that they are nevertheless engaged in commercial activity and secure a return for it. Having considered the matter, I am not clear in my mind why the amendments would give them carte blanche. We certainly do not want or intend them to do so. As she knows from the effusive terms of my congratulation to her on Second Reading, I endorse and applaud her work on the subject. I do not believe that anything that we are suggesting would undermine it, but as we do not intend at this stage to press the amendments, the hon. Lady can rest assured.

Rosie Winterton: The amendment states that
```licensable conduct' includes only conduct which is carried out in return for payment.'' 
I do not understand how that would cover the problems of wheelclampers. I still feel that it would allow them to continue working as they have been and would not enable them to be licensed.

John Bercow: I do not believe that that is true, because such operators are ultimately rewarded. They would be prevented from continuing excessive, damaging and in some cases obnoxious and threatening activities.
 I shall not press the amendments to a Division at this stage, in contrast to amendment No. 19, about which my hon. Friends and I feel especially strongly. I remind the Minister of the commitment that he made. I hope that he will feel able to reply to me in writing about the anxiety that I aired—to which he said that he had not previously given any thought—before we reach the next stage, or, if I may elliptically refer to it, before another event might intervene. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ronnie Fearn: I beg to move amendment No. 20, in page 2, line 40, leave out from `activities' to end of line 42.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 21, in page 2, line 42, at end insert
`or as required for the purpose of, or in connection with, any contract he has with his employer.'.

Ronnie Fearn: I am not sure whether we shall have time to debate the amendments before lunch or, indeed, whether we shall break for lunch.
 We welcome the introduction of mandatory licensing for individuals, which involves all aspects of the private security industry. It goes to the heart of the Bill's intentions in ensuring that certain minimum standards are met. We also welcome the Government's clarification in the other place of who is subject to licensing and who is not. However, if the Bill is to ensure that the entire industry is subject to the same standards, why are licenses not required for in-house operatives? That is the basis for the amendment. 
 My noble Friend Lord Thomas of Gresford pressed the Government on the matter in the other place and has still not received a decent answer. Perhaps the Minister will answer me today. We support the need for licensing, but why are the Government allowing for a loophole by excluding in-house operatives? Under the amendment, clause 3(2)(b) would stop at the word ``activities''. The other words— 
``for the purposes of, or in connection with, any contract for the supply of services under which his employer is or may be so required''— 
would be removed. I am not sure what those words mean. Perhaps the Minister will explain. 
 On amendment No. 21, would it not be more appropriate to add at the end of line 42 
``or as required for the purpose of, or in connection with, any contract he has with his employer''? 
In other words, if paragraph (b) is to be retained in its entirety, the wording in amendment No. 21 should be added. 
 It being One o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
Adjourned till this day at half-past Four o'clock.